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In the six years since the United States Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Booker,1 federal courts have been faced with
the challenge of balancing newfound district court discretion with
the need to maintain consistent and predictable appellate review
of sentencing decisions. In response, the Supreme Court subse-
quently decided Rita v. United States,2 Gall v. United States,3 and
Kimbrough v. United States4 in an attempt to further clarify the
rules governing federal sentencing practice. Despite these at-
tempts, federal district courts and courts of appeals continue to
encounter some confusion and inconsistency in sentencing.
My previous article, entitled Striking a Balance: The Need to
Temper Judicial Discretion Against a Background of Legislative
Interest in Federal Sentencing,5 began a discussion of federal sen-
tencing in the post-Booker world. The article proposed a new ap-
proach to sentencing issues called "guided discretion,"6 which at-
tempted to reconcile the need for discretionary sentencing with
the need for consistent and predictable appellate review. The ar-
ticle encouraged the federal judiciary to follow a simple template
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. 551 U.S. 338 (2007).
3. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
4. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
5. D. Michael Fisher, Striking a Balance: The Need to Temper Judicial Discretion
Against a Background of Legislative Interest in Federal Sentencing, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 65
(2007).
6. Id. at 82.
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when sentencing, one that urged district court judges to temper
their discretion with careful consideration of both the United
States Sentencing Commission policy statements and the advisory
guidelines sentencing range. 7 At the court of appeals level, the
article encouraged judges to employ reasonableness review as out-
lined in both Rita and Gall."
The first article acknowledged, however, that more changes
were likely to come in the wake of Rita and Gall as district courts
began exercising their newfound discretion and as courts of ap-
peals began to review the results of that discretion.9 Additionally,
the original article did not contain a discussion of the decision in
Kimbrough, which has further impacted federal sentencing. Giv-
en the changes over the last several years, the time has come to
reexamine the effect that Booker, Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough have
had on the federal sentencing landscape.
This article will proceed in four parts. Part I will address the
historical development of Supreme Court sentencing jurispru-
dence from Booker to Kimbrough. This discussion will identify the
directives in Booker and its progeny regarding both district court
discretion and appellate court review. Part II will address the
sentencing issues currently facing the courts of appeals, particu-
larly the struggle to define substantive reasonableness review. It
will also examine the differing approaches that some courts have
taken in the wake of Kimbrough as they have tried to define the
proper deference to be given to district court sentencing decisions.
Part III will analyze statistical evidence compiled by the Sentenc-
ing Commission to determine whether district judges' sentencing
habits and practices have changed significantly in light of their
newfound discretion and whether the courts of appeals have sig-
nificantly changed how they review sentencing decisions. Finally,
Part IV will look forward to the months and years ahead, when
courts will continue searching for a balance between discretion
and appellate review. To overcome some of these challenges, I will
expand on the theory of guided discretion by urging district court
judges to continue imposing reasoned and well-explained sentenc-
es that reflect all of the requirements in § 3553(a), while limiting
their use of discretion to only those cases where it is necessary. I
will also encourage the courts of appeals to continue following Su-
preme Court precedent, particularly those portions of Gall and
7. Id. at 88-96.
8. Id. at 96-98.
9. Id. at 98.
Duquesne Law Review
Kimbrough that permit closer scrutiny of district court discretion.
By implementing these goals, federal courts will hopefully usher
in a new age of sentencing that strikes a balance between in-
creased district court discretion and rational, consistent appellate
review.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF POST-BOOKER SENTENCING REFORM:
THE REEMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
After Booker made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough have each refined sentencing practices
throughout the federal judiciary. At the district court level, these
cases have substantially increased judges' discretion to impose
sentences outside of the advisory Guidelines range. Consequently,
Booker and its progeny have also led to difficulties at the appellate
level, where the courts of appeals must now review sentences for
"reasonableness," while still affording a great deal of deference to
the sentencing judge. Therefore, the post-Booker cases have done
little to clarify reasonableness review, particularly in the enigmat-
ic realm of "substantive reasonableness."
A. The Booker Quartet of Cases
The history of Booker can be traced to Apprendi v. New Jersey,10
which addressed the potential constitutional problems associated
with judicial fact-finding in criminal cases:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the max-
imum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment,
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
The principle established in Apprendi was later applied to man-
datory sentencing guidelines in the seminal case of Blakely v.
Washington,12 where the Supreme Court invalidated Washington's
mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme on Sixth Amendment
grounds. 1
3
10. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
11. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6
(1999)).
12. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
13. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-05.
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1. United States v. Booker: The Sentencing Guidelines are
no Longer Mandatory
Six months later, the Supreme Court addressed Blakely's effect
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Booker and a related
case, United States v. Fanfan.1 4 In Booker 15 the Supreme Court
determined that the Sentencing Guidelines violated a defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights by allowing judges to alter a defendant's
sentence based on facts that had not been proven to a jury.1 6 To
correct this problem, the Supreme Court determined that, rather
than finding the entire Guidelines scheme unconstitutional or
grafting a jury requirement onto each fact that affected a Guide-
lines sentence, Congress would prefer that the unconstitutional
portions of the Sentencing Reform Act 17 be excised.18 Therefore,
the Court removed 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), thus rendering the
Guidelines effectively advisory and outside the scope of Appren-
di.1 9 Although the Guidelines were no longer mandatory, the
Booker Court maintained that sentencing judges were still re-
quired to consider them as one of the seven factors set forth in
Section 3553(a).
20
In applying this remedy, the Court also had to excise the portion
setting forth the standard for appellate review, 21 because that
provision contained "critical cross-references" to the other excised
portions. 22 Section 3742(e) had previously provided for de novo
review of a district court's sentencing determination, but once it
was excised, the Court noted that there remained an implicit
standard of review in the newly revised guidelines:23
[w]e infer appropriate review standards from related statuto-
ry language, the structure of the statute, and the 'sound ad-
ministration of justice.' . . . And in this instance those factors,
in addition to the past two decades of appellate practice in
cases involving departures, imply a practical standard of re-
14. 543 U.S. 220 (2004).
15. For ease of reference, Booker and Fanfan are generally referred to by the single
name: Booker.
16. 542 U.S. at 233-34, 248.
17. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3742, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(2010).
18. Booker, 543 U.S. at 248-49.
19. Id. at 259.
20. Id. at 259-60.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).




view already familiar to appellate courts: review for 'unrea-
sonable[ness] '24
Therefore, since Booker, courts of appeals no longer review fed-
eral sentences de novo, but instead must review for "reasonable-
ness. '25 While that may have appeared to resolve the issue, ren-
dering the Guidelines advisory was simply the first step in a judi-
cial restructuring of sentencing and sentencing review. After
Booker, district courts and courts of appeals began the challenging
process of discerning how to sentence in an age of newfound dis-
cretion.
2. Rita v. United States: Courts of Appeals May Presume
Reasonableness
Following Booker, the courts of appeals struggled to articulate a
consistent process for conducting reasonableness review. In re-
sponse, some courts of appeals adopted a rule allowing within-
Guidelines sentences to be presumed reasonable, 26 while others
did not.27 The disagreement among the courts of appeals centered
around whether adopting the presumption would make the Sen-
tencing Guidelines functionally mandatory, thereby violating
Booker.
The Supreme Court resolved the disagreement in Rita v. United
States by holding that a court of appeals may invoke a presump-
tion of reasonableness when reviewing a within-Guidelines sen-
tence.28 The Supreme Court emphasized that the presumption
was not binding, nor did it "reflect strong judicial deference" to the
sentencing judge. 29 Instead, the rule merely recognized that when
a district judge imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, it indicated
that both the judge and the Sentencing Commission had reached
the same conclusion, thus "significantly increas[ing] the likelihood
24. Id. at 260-61 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 264.
26. E.g., United States v. Cage, 458 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Caw-
thorn, 429 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th
Cir. 2005).
27. E.g., United States v. Zavala, 443 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514,
518 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2006).
28. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
29. Id.
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that the sentence [was] reasonable ..... 30 It is important to note,
however, that the Rita presumption only applies to appellate re-
view, and does not allow district courts to simply impose a within-
Guidelines sentence without any further consideration.31 Rather,
district courts must still consider all of the Section 3553(a) factors
when imposing a sentence and make a discretionary, yet reasoned
decision based on those factors. Unfortunately, the Rita presump-
tion only applied to within-Guidelines sentences, thus leaving fed-
eral courts of appeals without guidance when a district court im-
posed a sentence outside the Sentencing Guidelines range.
3. Gall v. United States: Adopts the Abuse-of-Discretion
Standard
The Supreme Court further developed the concept of reasona-
bleness review in Gall v. United States, in which the Court was
tasked with determining whether a court of appeals could apply a
"proportionality test" to determine whether a sentence imposed
outside the Guidelines range was reasonable. 32 Under the test,
district courts were required to provide "extraordinary circum-
stances" to justify a sentence that substantially deviated from the
advisory Guidelines range.33 Once again, courts of appeals were
divided.3 4 The Gall Court confirmed that courts of appeals must
review all sentences-regardless of where they fall in relation to
the Guidelines range-under the deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. 35 By applying this deferential standard to all sentences,
the Gall Court reaffirmed its commitment to increasing district
court discretion in sentencing decisions.
In addition to announcing a concrete standard of review, Gall's
other significant contribution has been the creation of a bifurcated
system of appellate review that requires analysis for both proce-
dural and substantive reasonableness. 36 Under the procedural
prong, courts of appeals were directed to:
30. Id.
31. Id. at 351.
32. Gall, 552 U.S. at 40-41.
33. Id. at 41.
34. Compare United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that
an extraordinary deviation from the Guidelines must be justified by extraordinary circum-
stances); with Jimenez-Beltre, 440 F.3d at 518 (stating that Guidelines cannot be given
presumptive weight or be presumed to be correct).
35. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
36. Id.
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ensure that the district court committed no significant proce-
dural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calcu-
lating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as man-
datory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.
37
Procedural reasonableness is a fairly straightforward analysis,
requiring the court of appeals to "double check" the Guidelines
calculation made by the district court, review the basis for any
departure, and ensure that the district court considered all of the
Section 3553(a) factors.
38
Once a court of appeals has determined that the sentence is pro-
cedurally sound, it may then proceed to the second prong of the
Gall test, which requires the courts of appeals to:
take into account the totality of the circumstances, including
the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range .... [I]f
the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may
not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consid-
er the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to
the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a
whole, justify the extent of the variance. The fact that the
appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a dif-
ferent sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify re-
versal of the district court.
39
Based on this test, the Supreme Court concluded that reasona-
bleness review, as defined in Booker and Gall, should be "pellucid-
ly clear."40 Despite this assurance, the courts of appeals have re-




38. United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011). In a recent lengthy opin-
ion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned two sentences on
procedural reasonableness grounds, and in so doing, conducted an extensive discussion of
appellate review of sentences for procedural reasonableness. United States v. Fumo, Nos.
09-3388, 09-3389, 09-3390, 2011 WL 3672774, at *15-*31 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2011).
39. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
40. Id. at 46.
41. See generally Laura I. Appleman, Toward a Common Law of Sentencing, Gall,
Kimbrough, and the Search for Reasonableness, 21 FED. SENT'G REP. 3, 3 (2008) (noting
that, "[u]nfortunately for sentencing fans . . . the Court failed to clarify the definition of
reasonableness, leaving courts in the same indeterminate muddle as before.").
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4. Kimbrough v. United States: Policy Disagreement
Allowed
Following Gall, the Supreme Court completed the Booker quar-
tet of cases with Kimbrough v. United States. Kimbrough was
unique among the four cases in that the underlying crime was of
particular importance, specifically, a conviction for the manufac-
ture and distribution of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841.42 The Sentencing Guideline in question in Kimbrough was
Section 2D1.1(c), 43 which subjected the defendant to a sentence
equivalent to that of someone dealing one hundred times more
powder cocaine. 44 The Court addressed the question of whether a
sentence outside the advisory Guideline range '"is per se unrea-
sonable when it is based on a disagreement with the [100-to-I]
sentencing disparity for crack and powder cocaine offenses."'
45
The sentencing judge in Kimbrough recognized the 'dispropor-
tionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in
sentencing,"' and thus sentenced Kimbrough to fifteen years in
prison, four years below the minimum Guidelines sentence. 46 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the
sentence, noting that the sentence was "per se unreasonable" be-
cause it was based on a policy disagreement with the crack/powder
sentencing disparity in the Guidelines. 47 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals.
48
The Kimbrough Court determined that the Sentencing Commis-
sion did not exercise its "characteristic institutional role" in for-
mulating the crack cocaine Guideline; rather, it had relied almost
exclusively on the mandatory minimum sentences set forth in the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. 49 Since the Sentencing Commission
failed to apply the data and experience normally used to formulate
the Guidelines, the Court determined that the district judge was
better situated to formulate a sentence that met the requirements
of Section 3553(a).50 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a
judge could sentence a defendant outside the Guideline range
42. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 91.
43. Id. at 91-92 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(c) (2010).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 91 (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 174 F. App'x 798, 799 (4th Cir.
2006)).
46. Id. at 93.
47. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 93.
48. See id. at 93 n.4 (citing cases).
49. Id. at 109.
50. Id. at 110
649
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based on his or her policy disagreement with the disparity be-
tween powder and crack sentences in the Guidelines, provided the
sentence was framed "in line" with the requirements of Section
3553(a). 51 Consequently, the Kimbrough Court gave a great deal
of deference to the well-reasoned explanation provided by the dis-
trict court, which explained how the factors unique to Kim-
brough's case rendered the sentence reasonable. 52 It was with this
significant extension of district court discretion that the Supreme
Court concluded the Booker line of cases. Unfortunately, Rita,
Gall, and Kimbrough have largely left the courts of appeals to
fend for themselves with respect to review for reasonableness.
II. REASONABLENESS REVIEW OF SENTENCING: WHERE DO
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS STAND?
Following the Supreme Court's decisions in Booker, Rita, Gall,
and Kimbrough, several questions remain unanswered regarding
reasonableness review. First, the Supreme Court has yet to ade-
quately define the substantive reasonableness prong of the Gall
test. Second, without a complete definition of substantive reason-
ableness, the courts of appeals have differed over how to apply the
standard to district court sentencing determinations. Finally,
those differences have been compounded by inconsistencies in Gall
and Kimbrough, which have led to questions about the appropri-
ate degree of deference to be given to sentencing determinations.
These challenges have all hindered the development of a con-
sistent and predictable system of appellate sentencing review and
have contributed to the ongoing conflict between district court dis-
cretion and appellate review.
A. Reasonableness" Has yet to be Adequately Defined by the Su-
preme Court
Despite the Supreme Court's best efforts in Booker, Rita, Gall,
and Kimbrough to clarify the scope and definition of reasonable-
ness review, the courts of appeals remain unclear as to the exact
test to be applied when conducting substantive reasonableness
review.53 This uncertainty is the result of the piecemeal definition
51. Id. at 110-11.
52. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
53. Appleman, supra note 41, at 3.
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of reasonableness that has developed since Booker, which is only
applicable in limited circumstances.
First came Rita, which permitted appellate courts to presume
that a within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable.5 4 However, by
definition, Rita only applies to those sentences imposed within the
properly calculated Guidelines range.55 For example, in 2009,
within-Guidelines sentences accounted for almost fifty-seven per-
cent of all sentences imposed, and Rita allowed those sentences to
be presumed reasonable. 56 Unfortunately, Rita failed to address
the forty-three percent of sentences that fell outside the advisory
Guidelines range, all of which were consequently left subject to
the indeterminate "reasonableness" standard announced in Book-
er.
Gall, on the other hand, announced that the abuse-of-discretion
standard would apply to all sentences, not simply those that fall
within the advisory Guidelines range. Gall also finally announced
a concrete two-part test for determining whether a sentence was
reasonable. The test did not define the contours of analysis for
substantive reasonableness; it merely urged the courts to look to
the "totality of the circumstances" when reviewing the sentence.
5
The lack of guidance provided by the Gall Court regarding sub-
stantive reasonableness has led some scholars to question the
practicality of the reasonableness standard.58 Their concern is
that "reasonableness" and "abuse-of-discretion" are, in fact, two
distinct standards of review, with "reasonableness" being a more
specific (and more deferential) form of abuse-of-discretion re-
view. 59 Despite the distinction, the Gall Court seemingly used
both standards interchangeably to define appellate review of sen-
tencing determinations.6 0 Therefore, not only is the Gall test
somewhat unclear, but the abuse-of-discretion standard that it
54. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347.
55. Id. at 346.
56. See discussion infra Part III(A)(1) (discussing statistical evidence of district court
sentencing practices).
57. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
58. See Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing
Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1. (2008). The authors note that "several circuits 'expressly em-
ployed an "abuse of discretion" analysis' as a proxy for reasonableness review" due to confu-
sion over what the reasonableness standard meant, even before the Supreme Court adopted
the reasonableness standard in Booker. Id. at 15. (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Rivera,
241 F.3d 37, 40 n.4 (1st Cir. 2001)).
59. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 17-18 (citing Steven Alan Childress & Martha
S. Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 4.21, at 4-135 (3d ed. 1999)).
60. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46 (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-62).
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defines may contradict the reasonableness standard adopted in
Booker.
Finally, Kimbrough also increased the difficulty in defining rea-
sonableness review by allowing a sentencing judge to depart from
a Guidelines sentence based almost exclusively on a disagreement
with the policy underlying the Guidelines. 61 The Kimbrough
Court did not balance this increased discretion with heightened
appellate scrutiny in all cases. 62 Therefore, the Kimbrough hold-
ing did very little to supplement the definition of reasonableness
review; rather, it increased district court discretion while further
curtailing the appellate courts' ability to keep that discretion in
check.
Ultimately, it seems that the limited definition of reasonable-
ness review outlined by the Supreme Court has created more
questions than answers, particularly in the realm of substantive
reasonableness. Despite these difficulties, it is important to keep
in mind that, although the picture is incomplete, Booker and its
progeny have built the foundations of a strong system of appellate
review. This system, if followed, actually vests some discretion in
the courts of appeals to prevent the unfettered use of discretion at
the district court level.63 Unfortunately, as will be seen in the
next section, the courts of appeals have occasionally struggled to
fill in the gaps left by the Supreme Court.
B. Confusion Among the Courts of Appeals
The confusion over what reasonableness means, particularly in
the context of substantive reasonableness, has led the courts of
appeals to take an ad hoc approach to sentencing review that gives
varying degrees of deference to the sentencing court's determina-
tions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has set forth one of the more striking examples of deference in
United States v. Tomko. 64 In Tomko, the court defined substantive
reasonableness analysis by stating that "if the district court's sen-
tence is procedurally sound, [the court of appeals] will affirm it
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed
the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the
district court provided." 65 While no other courts of appeals have
61. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
62. This question will be explored more fully infra Part II(C)(2).
63. See discussion of guided discretion infra Part IV.
64. 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
65. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (emphasis added).
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explicitly adopted the Tomko "no reasonable judge" standard, oth-
ers have emphasized the high degree of deference to be given to
district court sentencing determinations. 66  The deference ex-
pressed by these courts appears to stem from language in Gall
recognizing that "[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to
find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual
case."67 Unfortunately, too much deference can lead courts of ap-
peals to forget that they are very often the last line of defense
against unwanted disparities in sentencing.
68
At the other end of the spectrum are courts of appeals that re-
view sentences with heightened scrutiny while still applying the
abuse-of-discretion standard. 69 In United States v. Pugh,70 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit discussed
how a reviewing court retains the discretion to closely scrutinize
the weight given to the Section 3553(a) factors, and may remand
for resentencing if the district court "has weighed the factors in a
manner that demonstrably yields an unreasonable sentence."71 In
other cases, courts appear to have followed the dicta in both Gall
and Kimbrough calling for increased scrutiny in certain circum-
stances. 72 These examples of heightened scrutiny appear to close-
ly reflect pre-Booker sentencing practices, where district court
judges had much less discretion, and appellate review was con-
ducted under the de novo standard.73 By engaging in such height-
ened review, these courts of appeals have indicated to the district
66. See, e.g., United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008). The Cavera
court stated that "[wie will ... set aside a district court's substantive determination only in
exceptional cases where the trial court's decision 'cannot be located within the range of
permissible decisions."' Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (citation omitted) (bold emphasis added).
See also United States v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that
"[rieview for reasonableness is deferential.").
67. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (internal quotation omitted).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), preempted in part by Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct.
1229 (2011).
69. See, e.g., Tomko, 562 F.3d at 578-79 (Fisher, J., dissenting); United States v. Taylor,
532 F.3d 68, 69-70 (1st Cir. 2008) (recognizing that although district courts are "empowered
with considerable discretion in sentencing," recent Supreme Court decisions have also
"underscored the importance of the district court's justifications" for sentencing decisions);
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that "[wihile Gall assur-
edly made clear the limited and deferential role of appellate courts in the sentencing pro-
cess... it was not a decision wholly without nuance or balance.").
70. 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (lth Cir. 2008).
71. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191.
72. E.g., Taylor, 532 F.3d at 69-70.
73. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
653
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courts that unfettered discretion will be met with increased appel-
late scrutiny.7 4
The cases discussed above illustrate the broad range of defer-
ence that courts of appeals accord district court sentencing deter-
minations under the auspices of reasonableness review. Despite
the inconsistencies, courts of appeals often give great weight to
the district court's thorough explanation of the reasons underlying
the sentencing determination. 75 This reliance on the district
court's explanation gives the court of appeals a concrete ground on
which to base its reasonableness review, and allows for increased
transparency in the sentencing process. Until courts have devel-
oped a more robust body of sentencing law, reliance on the district
court's explanation may be an astute exercise of appellate court
discretion that will ultimately help to push this area of law for-
ward and keep district courts from exercising unfettered discre-
tion.
C. Inconsistencies in Both Gall and Kimbrough
Beyond the insufficient definition of reasonableness review and
the resulting confusion, courts of appeals have also struggled to
reconcile inconsistent language in Gall and Kimbrough. In both
cases, the Supreme Court instructed the courts of appeals to give
great deference to district court sentencing determinations, 76
while at the same time, dicta in each case implied that heightened
review might be appropriate in certain circumstances. 77 Although
these inconsistencies evidence an attempt to reconcile sentencing
court discretion with consistent appellate review, that attempt has
largely resulted in more confusion over what reasonableness re-
view might actually entail. 76
74. See discussion of guided discretion infra Part IV(A)(2).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Lychock, 578 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 2009). The Lychock court
concluded that "by ignoring relevant factors and failing to offer a reasoned explanation
for its departure from the Guidelines, the District Court once again 'put at risk the sub-
stantive reasonableness of any decision it reached."' Lychock, 578 F.3d at 220. (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007)); United States v.
Garcia-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 132 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding a one-sentence explanation
to be insufficient, even in light of that court's practice of "go[ing] to great lengths to infer
the district court's reasoning from the record[.]"); United States v. Goffi, 446 F.3d 319, 321-
22 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the district court's verbal explanation, while brief, was suffi-
cient under § 3553(c), but remanding to allow for a more thorough written explanation for
the sentencing departure).
76. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
77. See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 34.
78. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 34.
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1. Gall and Proportionality Review
In Gall, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeals must re-
view all sentences under the abuse-of-discretion standard, 79 indi-
cating that sentencing review should be extremely deferential.8 0
Nevertheless, the Court also indicated that it "find[s] it uncontro-
versial that a major departure [from the Guidelines] should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor
one."8 1 The Court also added that "a district judge must give seri-
ous consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guide-
lines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually le-
nient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a
particular case with sufficient justifications."8 2 Ultimately,
this dicta requiring a more significant justification appears to con-
tradict the language in both Booker and Gall requiring all sen-
tencing determinations to be reviewed for reasonableness under
the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
In one example of the resulting confusion, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected strict
proportionality review, but has continued to employ "heightened"
review since Gall was decided.8 3 Therefore, the language in Gall
appears to have left the door open for courts of appeals to continue
requiring more substantial justifications for outside-Guidelines
sentences, albeit not rising to the level of strict proportionality
review. As will be discussed infra, this heightened review may be
necessary to control newfound district court discretion and to pre-
vent undesirable disparities in sentencing.
2. Kimbrough's "Closer Review"Dictum
Kimbrough also contains inconsistent language that has caused
confusion over what degree of deference should be given to a sen-
tencing judge's policy disagreement with certain Guidelines sen-
tences. In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court recognized that appel-
late courts should defer to a district court's policy disagreement
79. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
80. But cf. id. (noting that even if the appellate court would have arrived at a different
sentence, that is not sufficient to justify reversal of the district court).
81. Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
83. Compare United States v. Lehmann, 513 F.3d 805, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting
the "impermissibility" of "proportionality' review"), with United States v. Austad, 519 F.3d
431, 434-35 (8th Cir. 2008) (explicitly employing proportionality review and citing cases
that have done the same).
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with the advisory Guidelines range.8 4 However, the Court also
noted in dicta that "closer review may be in order" when the
sentencing judge varies a sentence based solely on such policy dis-
agreements.8 5 This contradiction appears to force appellate courts
to choose between two different standards of review: abuse of dis-
cretion for sentences based on case-specific facts; and "closer re-
view" for sentences imposed outside the Guidelines range for pure-
ly policy reasons.8 6 Several problems have stemmed from this con-
tradictory language.
The first problem is the question of which sentences (besides
those imposed pursuant to the crack Guideline) might be subject
to Kimbrough's "closer review" requirements.8 7 When faced with a
new policy disagreement, courts of appeals have addressed this
problem in different ways: some have carefully scrutinized the
Sentencing Commission's role in formulating the Guideline in
question, and have only employed closer review in situations anal-
ogous to the crack cocaine Guideline.88 Others have employed
closer review and found the policy disagreement insufficient to
justify a below-Guidelines sentence.8 9 Finally, still others have
acknowledged the closer review requirement, but have not firmly
resolved which Guidelines (besides the crack cocaine Guideline)
should be subject to it.90 In these situations, courts are often split
over whether the underlying facts allow for application of the
Kimbrough rule, and by extension, whether those sentences
should then be subject to closer review.
84. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
85. Id. at 89 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 351) (emphasis added).
86. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 34.
87. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 34.
88. E.g., United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 143 (3d Cir. 2009) (extend-
ing the reasoning in Kimbrough to include sentence variances based on the disparity be-
tween fast-track and non-fast-track judicial districts); United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d
1301, 1311 n.13 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the career offender Guideline was not like the
crack Guideline because it was adopted at the "express direction of Congress" and was
therefore not subject to policy disagreement under Kimbrough).
89. E.g., United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a
below-Guideline sentence for a convicted pedophile was unreasonable because the Guide-
line sentence was not "too harsh" considering the harm that such crimes cause).
90. E.g., Cavera, 550 F.3d at 192 (finding that the court does not "take the Supreme
Court's comments concerning the scope and nature of 'closer review' to be the last word on
these questions."); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 36 n.179 (citing United
States v. Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 2008)).
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i. Specific Instances Questioning Kimbrough's
Applicability
One type of case where courts are conflicted involves "fast-track"
early disposition sentencing programs in which immigration de-
fendants can receive reduced sentences by pleading guilty and
waiving their rights to appeal and to certain post-conviction relief.
Since only a small percentage of judicial districts have fast-track
programs, there is the potential for disparate sentences depending
on where a defendant is sentenced.9' In United States v. Arrelu-
cea-Zamudio, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit extended Kimbrough's reasoning by analogy to
include policy disagreements with the sentencing disparity be-
tween fast-track and non-fast-track disposition of illegal reentry
cases. 92 The court reasoned that sentencing judges have the dis-
cretion to consider all of the Section§ 3553(a) factors together and
that fact may account for the disparity created by fast-track pro-
grams in the sentencing determination.93 Furthermore, the court
rejected the contention that district judges should focus almost
entirely on Congress' intent in creating the programs, rather than
on the Section 3553(a) factors as a whole. 94 The United States
Courts of Appeals for the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
followed suit. 95
On the other hand, the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have refused to allow vari-
ances based on policy disagreements with the fast-track disparity
on the grounds that such variances would contravene the congres-
sional policy of creating fast-track programs, as expressed in the
PROTECT Act. 96 Rather than focusing on judicial discretion to
91. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 146 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, MEMORANDUM OF DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Reauthorization ofEarly
Disposition Programs (Feb. 1 2008),
http://www.fd.org/pdflib[FastTrackReauthorizationO8.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2011)); see
also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (2010).
92. 581 F.3d at 143.
93. Id. at 149.
94. Id.
95. See United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 417-18 (7th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244, 248-49 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodri-
guez, 527 F.3d 221, 231 (1st Cir. 2008).
96. See United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gomez-
Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools




disagree with the Guidelines, these courts have focused on the
expressed congressional intent as a way to distinguish the fast-
track disparity from the crack/powder disparity addressed in Kim-
brough.97 By doing so, these courts have essentially given greater
weight to consideration of Section 3553(a)(5) rather than seeking a
balanced consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors as a whole.
Another area in which courts of appeals have been divided over
Kimbrough's applicability is child pornography.98 Since Kim-
brough, several district courts have noted that, similar to the
crack cocaine guideline, the child pornography and child exploita-
tion Guidelines should not be entitled to as much judicial defer-
ence, since they lack the level of empirical support and Sentencing
Commission expertise found in most other Guidelines.9 9 Conse-
quently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
has questioned the reliability of the child pornography Guidelines,
noting how in some cases the "run-of-the-mill" Guidelines sen-
tence for possession of child pornography can actually exceed the
sentence for illegal sexual conduct with a child. 100 Likewise, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has extended
Kimbrough to include policy disagreements in a child pornography
case as well. 10 1
Nevertheless, other courts have taken a different approach by
deferring to Congress' intent, based on the number of legislative
changes that have been made to the child pornography and exploi-
tation Guidelines. For example, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit has indicated that it will not allow sen-
tencing courts to reject the child pornography Guidelines based on
a Kimbrough-like policy disagreement, noting that "it is unques-
tionably Congress' constitutional prerogative to issue sentencing
97. United States v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Gomez-Herrera,
523 F.3d 554, 559 (5th Cir. 2008).
98. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Appellate Review of Sentencing Policy Decisions After
Kimbrough, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 717, 735-36 (Winter 2009).
99. See United States v. Huffstatler, 571 F.3d 620, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Shipley, 560 F. Supp. 2d 739, 744-46 (S.D. Iowa 2008); United States v. Hanson,
561 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1008-12 (E.D. Wis. 2008); United States v. Baird, 580 F. Supp. 2d
889, 894-96 (D. Neb. 2008); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382, 412 (D. N.J.
2008)).
100. United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 186-88 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting a sentence
as unreasonable and explicitly extending the Kimbrough rule to include the child pornog-
raphy Guideline).
101. United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608-09 (3d Cir. 2010) (relying on the reason-
ing in Arrelucea-Zamudio to extend Kim brough to include the child pornography guideline).
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directives."'0 2 These splits exemplify how Kimbrough has added to
the confusion among the courts of appeals by raising questions
about how far district courts may extend their discretion before
the courts of appeals must respond by exercising greater scrutiny
of those decisions.
3. Post-Kimbrough Deference: De Novo Review of Policy
Determinations
Assuming that courts are free to expand Kimbrough's reasoning
to include policy disagreements with other Guidelines, other ques-
tions remain regarding what "closer review" might entail in those
cases. By giving district court judges the discretion to categorical-
ly disregard the crack, fast-track, and child pornography Guide-
lines, some have argued that district judges are now essentially
making policy judgments without being subjected to adequate ap-
pellate review. As described by Professors Hessick and Hessick:
[a]fter Kimbrough, district courts have the power to make pol-
icy determinations about how long a sentence should be for a
particular crime in the average case. Such a determination
sets forth a general rule, independent of specific facts, for the
amount of punishment that should be meted out for a particu-
lar crime. Because they are legal determinations, these policy
determinations would ordinarily be subject to de novo review,
not the deferential [abuse-of-discretion] standard .... 103
The question thus becomes whether the "closer review" called
for by Kimbrough should actually be read as requiring de novo
review of any policy disagreements that sentencing courts may
have, since policy determinations, as legal conclusions, are gener-
ally subject to de novo review. 10 4 After Booker, at least one court
of appeals openly engaged in de novo review of a district court's
weighing of the Section 3553(a) factors,10 5 but that decision was
later vacated by the Supreme Court as being in violation of the
Court's holding in Gall.10 6
102. United States v. McNerney, No. 09-4011, 2011 WL 691178, at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 1,
2011).
103. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 58, at 27.
104. Id. at 26-27.
105. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 806 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Garcia-Lara, 499 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007), vacated by Garcia-Lara v. United
States, 553 U.S. 1016 (2008)).
106. Garcia-Lara, 553 U.S. 1016.
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Courts of appeals appear to be unable to engage in de novo re-
view because of the explicit directives in both Booker and Gall to
review sentence determinations under the deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. 10 7 Indeed, Gall flatly rejected the require-
ment of de novo review for sentencing variances.108 Long-standing
Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that although sentencing de-
partures may occasionally call for legal determinations, courts
cannot label some parts of the review de novo while labeling other
parts abuse of discretion.'0 9 Furthermore, rejecting the de novo
standard in sentencing cases is consistent with the general trend
in post-Booker Supreme Court jurisprudence that has consistently
increased district court discretion at the expense of appellate court
scrutiny.
Nevertheless, although Booker and its progeny have certainly
diluted the courts of appeals' ability to exercise heightened review
of sentencing determinations, that ability has not been completely
stripped away. Indeed, in light of district courts' increased ability
to make policy determinations, it is imperative that the courts of
appeals be able to balance that discretion with heightened scruti-
ny of sentencing decisions. Therefore, the courts of appeals must
begin employing the "closer review" called for by Kimbrough and
by seeking out "more substantial justification[s]" as permitted by
Gall when district courts impose sentences that are outside of the
Guidelines range. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit explicitly recognized this need in Smart.1 0 The
courts of appeals must particularly embrace the dicta in Kim-
brough and Gall in those close cases cited above, where district
courts use their newfound discretion to grant a variance based on
a Kimbrough-like policy disagreement. By carefully engaging in
"closer review," courts of appeals will be able to keep a close eye on
district court discretion, thus guarding against unwarranted dis-
parities in sentencing.
107. E.g., United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (recognizing that
"not all issues that may be raised on appeal can be neatly separated into the categories of
'fact' and 'law.'... [W]e must review the district court's decision under 'the familiar abuse-
of-discretion standard."').
108. Gall, 552 U.S. at 59.
109. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2003), as stated in Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc.
v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622 F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2011).
110. Smart, 518 F.3d at 807 (noting that the dicta in Gall and Kimbrough are still useful
when a court of appeals makes an "individual assessment" of the district court sentencing
decision).
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Ultimately, the challenges facing the courts of appeals in the
wake of Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough are substantial. In light of
these difficulties, it is unsurprising that the courts of appeals have
split on several important legal questions. Nevertheless, some
district courts continue to freely exercise their broad new discre-
tion, seemingly without regard for the potential consequences to
the larger body of sentencing law.
III. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BOOKER AND ITS PROGENY: GIVEN
DISTRICT COURTS' NEW DISCRETION IN SENTENCING, WHAT HAS
CHANGED?
Statistics collected by the United States Sentencing Commission
have revealed surprising things about the sentencing practices at
both the district court and court of appeals levels. Based on this
data, district courts seem to be exercising their newfound discre-
tion in earnest, resulting in a substantial increase in the number
of outside-Guidelines sentences imposed since Booker. At the
court of appeals level, the statistics indicate that courts have
largely returned to pre-Booker rates of affirmance, and defendants
do not seem any more likely to appeal their sentences as a result
of Booker. Therefore, the statistics seem to suggest that the con-
fusion facing the courts of appeals regarding substantive reasona-
bleness may not be as significant as some have feared, while con-
cerns about district court sentencing disparities may pose a real
problem.
A. Pre-Booker and Post-Booker Trends in District Court Sentenc-
ing Decisions
1. Within-Guidelines Sentences
In 2004, the year before Booker, 71.8 percent of all federal de-
fendants were sentenced within the applicable Guidelines
range. 1 ' That number dropped more than ten percentage points
in 2006.112 In the years since Booker, between 2006 and 2009,113
111. Percent of Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure-Figure G, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
http://www.ussc.govlData-and-Statistics/AnnualjReports-andSourcebooks/2007/SBTOCO
7.htm [hereinafter 2007 SOURCEBOOK].
112. Percent of Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure-Figure G, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
http://www.ussc.gov/Data-and_Statistics/Annual-Reports-andSourcebooks/2009/SBTOCO
9.htm [hereinafter 2009 SOURCEBOOK].
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the percentage of within-Guidelines sentences has continued to
fall, from 61.6 to 56.8 percent.11 4 All told, the total number of
within-Guidelines sentences has dropped by fifteen-percentage
points since 2004. This change is certainly significant and repre-
sents an abrupt shift in sentencing practices coinciding with the
Booker decision. In fact, the ten-percentage point drop between
2004 and 2006 is the sharpest decline in all the years of available
statistics. This seems to indicate that Booker and its progeny
have encouraged district judges to vary from the Guidelines with
increased frequency since 2006.
However, before these statistics cause too much alarm, it should
be noted that historical trends do indicate that the percentage of
within-Guidelines sentences has dropped significantly at other
times as well. For instance, between 1990 and 2001, the percent-
age of within-Guidelines sentences fell from 83.41 5 to 64 per-
cent,116 representing a decrease of 19.4 percentage points. There-
fore, courts have significantly changed their sentencing practices
in the past. Needless to say, although past changes have been
significant, they occurred over a much longer period of time than
the shift following Booker. Consequently, although sentencing
practices seem to have changed largely within the bounds of his-
torical trends, courts have never before caused such a drastic shift
in sentencing practices in such a short period of time.
The decrease in within-Guidelines sentences has also corre-
sponded to a nearly identical increase in below-Guidelines sen-
tences. The most significant change took place between 2004 and
2006, when the number of below-Guidelines sentences nearly tri-
113. Although the U.S. Sentencing Commission does compile quarterly reports of sen-
tencing statistics, they are not to be treated as final until they are compiled into the annual




USSC 2010_QuarterReport_4th.pdf. Consequently, 2009 is the most recent year for
which Sourcebook data is available. Furthermore, statistics for fiscal year 2005 have been
omitted from this analysis due to the significant aberrations created by Booker.
114. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 112.
115. Percent of Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure-Figure G, U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS,
http://www.ussc.gov/Data andStatistics/AnnualReports-andSourcebooks/1996/fig-g.pdf
[hereinafter 1996 SOURCEBOOK].
116. Percent of Offenders Receiving Each Type of Departure-Figure G, U.S. SENTENCING
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pled, from 4.6 percent before Booker to 12.1 percent after.117 Fur-
thermore, that number continued to increase to sixteen-percent in
2009.118 Another increase came in the number of above-
Guidelines sentences. Since 2004, the number of defendants re-
ceiving above-Guidelines sentences has more than doubled, from
0.6 percent before Booker to 1.6 percent in 2006.119 Furthermore,
that percentage has remained more than double its pre-Booker
level through 2009.120 Ultimately, these statistics strongly indi-
cate that district judges have been exercising their newfound dis-
cretion to impose more sentences outside the Guidelines, but as
we will see, this nationwide shift in sentencing patterns has also
had a significant impact on sentencing disparities at the individu-
al level.
2. Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity
In addition to the broad nationwide changes in sentencing hab-
its, there have been many anecdotal reports of significant dispari-
ties in sentences imposed by different judges at the district court
level.1 21 In late 2010, Professor Ryan Scott conducted an empirical
study of judges' sentencing habits in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, revealing shocking evi-
dence of inter-judge sentencing disparities. Ultimately, Professor
Scott concluded that individual sentencing judges have a tremen-
dous effect on sentencing disparities, and their influence over sen-
tence length has continued to increase since Booker.122 The most
striking data to emerge from Professor Scott's study illustrates the
average degree of variance from the Guidelines range in the wake
of Booker, Gall and Kimbrough. 23 The data reveals that after
Booker, average sentences in the District of Massachusetts varied
by up to a year and a half, depending on which judge imposed the
sentence. 124 This data seems to confirm fears that individual
judges may be using their newfound discretion to impose more
disparate sentences. Although Professor Scott's study is interest-
ing and potentially sheds light on a serious problem, the results
117. 2007 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111.
118. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 112.
119. 2007 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 111.
120. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 112.
121. Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
122. Id. at 30.




are far from conclusive considering that he only had access to data
from one district court. Additionally, the disparities may reflect
factors unique to the individual defendants, as opposed to simply a
cavalier attitude toward sentencing. Until more data becomes
available, Professor Scott's study nevertheless seems to be in line
with the results on the national level, which indicates that district
judges have been imposing increasingly disparate sentences.
125
B. Statistics Related to Appeals
Two sets of statistics at the appellate level also reflect surpris-
ing results since Booker. The first set demonstrates that Booker
seems to have had little effect on defendants' decisions to appeal
their sentence, despite the evidence of confusion amongst the
courts of appeals regarding post-Booker reasonableness review.
The second set reveals that the appellate courts are also affirming
sentences at approximately the same rate as before Booker, lead-
ing to the conclusion that the courts of appeals are beginning to
develop a more consistent body of sentencing law.
1. Number of Appeals
Since 1996, the number of appeals involving sentencing issues
has generally increased, with the largest single-year jump actually
occurring between 2000 and 2001, when sentence-only appeals
increased from 40.9 to fifty-one percent of all appeals.' 26 Overall,
the lowest number of sentences appealed occurred in 1996, when
only 38.5 percent of all appeals were for sentences only, compared
to a high of sixty percent in 2006, the year after Booker. This in-
crease in sentence appeals seems to be a part of a larger trend,
probably unrelated to Booker, of defendants being more likely to
appeal their sentences in recent years.
Although sentence-only appeals have remained relatively con-
sistent, sentence and conviction appeals 27 dramatically increased
between 2004 and 2006. In that time, the number of sentence and
125. See discussion supra Part III(A).
126. App'x 1. The Sentencing Commission Sourcebooks categorize appeals statistics
according to three categories: sentence-only appeals, conviction-only appeals, and those
that appeal both conviction and sentence. Except where indicated, all statistics provided in
this section refer to the sentence-only appeals. Likewise, all appellate review statistics
refer to affirmance rates of sentencing appeals. For a comparison between sentence-only
appeals and appeals involving both sentencing and conviction issues see App'x 1.
127. This includes both sentencing-only appeals and appeals of both sentences and con-
victions. App'x 1.
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conviction appeals jumped from sixty-nine to 83.6 percent. 128 This
increase of 14.6 percentage points probably reflects the uncertain-
ty surrounding the Booker decision, which may have encouraged
defendants who appealed their conviction to appeal their sentence
as well. Despite the jump, it is equally surprising how quickly the
number of these appeals has returned to pre-Booker ranges. By
2008, the number of sentencing and conviction appeals fell from
83.6 to 72.9 percent, close to the historical average rate of 69.8
percent.129 Therefore, although Booker had a brief impact on the
number of sentence and conviction appeals, larger historical
trends reveal that its overall impact on the number of appeals has
been minimal.
2. Percentage of Appeals that are Affirmed
More surprisingly, Booker has not had a significant impact on
the rate at which sentences are affirmed on appeal. Prior to Book-
er in 2004, the courts of appeals nationwide affirmed 79.5 percent
of all sentence appeals. 130 In 2006, that number had decreased to
67.8 percent. 131 This decline in affirmances presumably reflects
appellate courts' tendency to carefully scrutinize sentencing deci-
sions after the Guidelines were declared advisory. However, the
courts have once again self-corrected, and affirmances have
steadily risen from seventy-nine percent in 2007 to 80.8 percent in
2008 and finally to 82.9 percent in 2009.132 This rebound puts the
2009 statistics only slightly above the historical average of 77.1
percent. 133 Additionally, the slight increase in affirmances since
Booker should come as no surprise in light of the increased appel-
late deference called for by Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. Ultimate-
ly, despite confusion regarding reasonableness review, it appears
as though the courts of appeals have naturally returned to their
historic rates of affirmance, albeit with a slight increase attribut-
able to evolving Supreme Court jurisprudence.
In the six years since Booker, the sentencing statistics compiled
by the United States Sentencing Commission paint an interesting
picture. Despite drastic changes in district court sentencing rates









have largely returned to pre-Booker sentencing practices, with
minor adjustments to account for Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.
Nevertheless, the cases indicate that the courts of appeals remain
uncertain about the proper scope of reasonableness review, raising
the question of where the federal courts go from here.
IV. GOING FORWARD: SENTENCING IN THE NEW POST-KIMBROUGH
WORLD
Many questions remain following Booker and its progeny, and
the cases and statistics make it difficult to see whether sentencing
at either the district court or court of appeals levels has become
any clearer. Given these challenges, federal courts must continue
to develop a new approach to sentencing, one that balances dis-
trict court discretion and consistent appellate review, while still
respecting the interests of Congress in the sentencing process and
developing a more coherent body of federal sentencing law.
A. Possible Solutions for the Federal Judiciary
Many scholars have suggested ways that the federal judiciary
can improve in the years ahead. Among the suggestions are calls
to "let the guidelines be guidelines," 134 and to encourage the devel-
opment of a federal "common law" of sentencing. 13 5 Guided discre-
tion also calls upon judges at both levels to exercise their discre-
tion within reasonable bounds and to be mindful of the role that
the courts should play in the larger federal system. 136 By building
on these ideas and incorporating them into federal sentencing
practice, district courts and courts of appeals will be better suited
to address post-Booker sentencing with more consistency and pre-
dictability, possibly without the need for further Supreme Court
guidance.
1. Guided Discretion at the District Court Level
District court judges face the first hurdle in sentencing: select-
ing an appropriate sentence that accounts for factors unique to the
individual defendant, yet respects the Guidelines and the need for
134. Gerard E. Lynch, Letting Guidelines Be Guidelines (And Judges Be Judges), OHIO
STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AMICI BLOG, (Dec. 28, 2008),
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcllblog/Articlesjl1Lynch-final- 12-28-07.pdf.
135. Appleman, supra note 40, at 4.
136. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 88-89.
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congressional involvement in sentencing determinations. To ac-
complish this, I have suggested that district courts rely on the fac-
tors set forth in Section 3553(a), as both Congress and the Su-
preme Court have instructed. 137 This practice fits into the larger
post-Booker sentencing paradigm set forth by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Gun-
ter.138 Gunter instructs district courts to follow a three-step sen-
tencing process, requiring them to (1) calculate defendants' Guide-
line sentences as was required before Booker; (2) formally rule on
both parties' motions and declare whether a variance will be
granted; and finally, (3) consider all relevant Section 3553(a) fac-
tors.139 Guided discretion is most important at step three, where
Section 3553(a)'s subparts can be divided into those factors that
allow for discretion, and those that require the sentencing judge to
consider congressional interests.
i. Discretionary Factors
Factors one, two, three and seven 140 allow sentencing judges to
exercise a great deal of discretion that would otherwise not exist
in a mandatory-Guidelines world. Factor one allows the judge to
consider facts unique to the case, including the defendant's "histo-
ry and characteristics" such as age, education, vocational skills,
mental and emotional condition, physical condition, employment,
and family and community ties.141 These factors are not included
as part of the Guidelines considerations, but can certainly help to
determine the most appropriate sentence for individual offend-
ers. 14
2
Factor two allows the sentencing judge to consider the various
purposes of sentencing and how they are best served in each
case. 143 The purposes to be considered at this step are retribution,
deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation. 144 Once
again, these factors help the sentencing judge to tailor each sen-
tence to the individual characteristics of the defendant and his or
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7).
138. 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
139. Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.
140. Although the need for restitution embodied in Section 3553(a)(7) certainly reflects a
discretionary determination made by the sentencing judge, it is not a factor that I take up
in great detail here.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
142. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 71, 84-85, 90-91.
143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
144. Id. at (A)-(D).
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her offense. For example, if a judge believes that a defendant
would be most helped by a sentence focusing on treatment and
rehabilitation, factor two gives the judge discretion to emphasize
these goals. On the other hand, if a judge believes that a defend-
ant poses a particularly acute risk of danger to others in the com-
munity, he or she may adjust the sentence by weighing that con-
sideration accordingly.
Finally, factor three enhances district judges' discretion by al-
lowing them to consider what kinds of sentences-prison, fines,
home detention, etc.-are available for each crime. 145 This discre-
tion allows the judge to fashion a sentence that properly reflects
the determinations made in factors one and two. As noted above,
the offender that poses a risk to the community may face a longer
term of imprisonment based on the analysis at factor three. Tak-
en as a whole, factors one through three encourage judges to use
their discretion and to consider many factors that would otherwise
be left out of the sentencing process, yet might have a significant
impact on the resulting sentence.
ii. Congressional Considerations
Factors four, five and six require the sentencing judge to set
aside some discretion and to consider the significant legislative
interest in sentencing decisions. Factor four is perhaps the most
controversial, since it requires the district court to take into ac-
count the advisory Guidelines sentence. 146 Although the Guide-
lines are no longer mandatory, they reflect a process of careful
deliberation by the Sentencing Commission that takes into consid-
eration the goals of sentencing set forth by Congress, pertinent
policy statements, and years of sentencing practice. 47 This pro-
cess ultimately produces a Guideline range that generally fulfills
the requirements of Section 3553(a) in the "mine run" of cases.
48
However, it is also important to note that the district court need
not actually impose a within-Guidelines sentence; rather, the ad-
visory sentence must be considered along with all of the Section
3553(a) factors in order to arrive at a well-reasoned sentence.
49
Therefore, most of judges' post-Booker discretion now exists be-
cause they may disregard factor four. Despite this new discretion,
145. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3).
146. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
147. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 350-51.
148. Id. at 351.
149. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50.
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Judge Gerard E. Lynch of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has emphasized the importance of
the advisory sentence by recognizing that the Commission is bet-
ter suited to "weighing broad social policy" and responding to
"democratic political opinion."150 This perspective on district court
deference serves as a potent counterpoint to those judges who may
seek to use increased discretion as an excuse to sentence without
regard for the Guidelines. Although Judge Lynch urges his fellow
judges to "treat the Guidelines as guidelines, and not as a
straightjacket," he still recognizes the importance of the Commis-
sion's expertise as embodied by the Guidelines. 1 1 Furthermore,
by carefully considering the advisory Guideline sentence, judges
will not only be helped along in the sentencing process, but they
can also benefit by having a stronger basis for their sentencing
decision should it be appealed. However, in those cases where a
district court chooses to exercise its discretion and impose a sen-
tence outside of the Guidelines range, the judge must also remem-
ber that he or she may still be subject to "closer review" or be ex-
pected to provide a "more significant justification" to support that
decision. Thus, it is imperative that district courts calculate and
carefully consider the advisory Guidelines sentence as part of the
sentencing process, even in the wake of Booker.152
Factor five explicitly requires sentencing judges to consider the
legislative interest in the sentencing process in the form of policy
statements contained in the Guidelines. 53 These policy state-
ments are an integral part of the sentencing process, but their role
has changed significantly following the Supreme Court's decision
in Kimbrough, which allows judges to actively disagree with the
Guidelines' policy determinations. 154 The policy statements now
act as a foil for district judges, who must still consider the state-
ment even though he or she might ultimately choose to disagree
with it. Furthermore, the judge must then go on to frame his or
her sentence "in line" with the other Section 3553(a) factors.1 55
This is particularly important when a judge chooses to disregard a
150. Lynch, supra note 132, at 5.
151. Lynch, supra note 132, at 1.
152. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 94 (noting that "every court of appeals to have consid-
ered the question has required that district courts properly calculate a defendant's advisory
Guidelines range as part of a proper sentencing determination"); see also Fisher, supra note
5, at 94 n.151 (citing authority from circuit courts of appeals from across the country).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5).
154. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110-11.
155. Id. at 111.
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Guidelines policy statement because it will provide support for the
sentencing decision under the closer scrutiny at the appellate lev-
el. Thus, although Kimbrough allows district judges to disregard
a policy statement, they must still consider those policy state-
ments as a part of the larger sentencing process in order to con-
clude that a different sentence would best suit a particular de-
fendant.
Finally, factor six has become particularly important since
Booker because it requires district courts to minimize sentencing
disparities, despite their newfound discretion. 156 Sentencing sta-
tistics reveal that this concern may be very real, as sentencing
disparities have generally increased since Booker. Needless to
say, the exercise of guided discretion requires that district courts
maintain a uniform system of sentencing, even without mandatory
sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, district judges must consider
disparity as part of the sentencing procedure, and must remember
that uniform sentencing is a goal for both Congress and the Sen-
tencing Commission. Failure to consider sentencing disparities
can lead to reversal on appeal as courts of appeals employ closer
scrutiny or require heightened justifications. Additionally, if dis-
trict courts fail to keep sentencing disparities in check, they risk
the very real possibility of legislative backlash in the form of new
sentencing legislation that will take back the discretion granted in
Booker.157
Ultimately, guided discretion seeks a balance between discre-
tion and uniformity that requires the district court to account for
the defendant's needs, the Sentencing Commission's expertise,
and Congress' interests. This complex balancing requires serious
consideration of all the Section 3553(a) factors and a thorough ex-
planation of the resulting sentence. Perhaps more importantly,
such balancing requires an understanding that discretion is to be
used only when necessary, as part of the larger sentencing process
set forth in Gunter. By following this approach, district court
judges will provide a strong foundation for equally well-reasoned
and consistent appellate review.
2. Guided Discretion at the Appellate Level
Guided discretion also requires the courts of appeals to rely on
the existing Supreme Court paradigm established in Rita, Gall,
156. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
157. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 87-88.
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and Kimbrough as the starting point for all appellate review of
sentences. After Gall, the courts of appeals have a general
framework for sentencing review that requires analysis for both
procedural and substantive reasonableness.1 5 8 The courts of ap-
peals should have little difficulty applying the procedural prong of
the Gall test to determine whether the district court properly cal-
culated the Guidelines range, took into account all of the Section
3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the resulting sentence.
By strictly enforcing these procedural requirements, the courts of
appeals will have a uniform basis on which to determine whether
many sentences are reasonable.
Once a sentence has been found to be procedurally reasonable,
the courts of appeals must then apply the substantive reasonable-
ness prong of the Gall test. If courts apply the rules set forth in
Rita and Kimbrough, many of the difficulties with substantive
reasonableness may never materialize. For example, since within-
Guidelines sentences have accounted for more than half of all sen-
tences imposed since Booker,159 a majority of sentences could be
declared substantively reasonable simply by adopting and apply-
ing the Rita presumption. This remains true despite some courts
of appeals' continued refusal to adopt the presumption. 160 Indeed,
scholars concede that formally adopting the presumption often
amounts to a "distinction without a difference[,]' 16' and even those
courts that refuse to do so have recognized that within-Guidelines
sentences are nearly always reasonable. 62  Consequently, all
courts of appeals can benefit from the Rita presumption by limit-
ing the number of cases that are subject to substantive reasona-
bleness review.
After Kimbrough, outside-Guidelines sentences based on policy
disagreements may also be considered reasonable, provided the
district court has set forth an adequate rationale that is firmly
158. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
159. 2009 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 110 (noting that 56.8 percent of all sentences im-
posed in 2009 were within the applicable guidelines).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (explicitly
declining to adopt the presumption of reasonableness established in Rita).
161. Carty, 520 F.3d at 993-94 (citations omitted) (noting that "the difference appears
more linguistic than practical: Those circuits that have not adopted a presumption of rea-
sonableness have nevertheless concluded 'that in the overwhelming majority of cases, a
Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be
reasonable."'); Lindsay C. Harrison, Appellate Discretion and Sentencing After Booker, 62
U. MIAMi L. REv. 1115, 1130 (Jul. 2008) (noting that "the decision whether to apply a pre-
sumption of reasonableness has had no measurable effect on the outcome of sentencing
appeals.").
162. Carty, 520 F.3d at 994.
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grounded in the Section 3553(a) factors. Although there remains
some debate over which Guidelines are subject to disagreement,
courts have indicated that a well-explained sentence is probably
more likely to be found reasonable. 163 Therefore, after relying on
existing precedent and applying Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough, fewer
cases actually remain subject to the questions surrounding sub-
stantive reasonableness review.
Yet, for those cases that continue to defy reasonableness review,
the Supreme Court has actually provided further guidance in Gall
and Kimbrough in the form of heightened review.164 The courts of
appeals should remember that these statements are valuable tools
for defining the scope of substantive reasonableness, not hin-
drances to effective appellate review. By employing the height-
ened review imagined in Gall and Kimbrough, the courts of ap-
peals can characterize "reasonableness" as a continuum, rather
than a single point. Consequently, courts may shift to a closer
form of reasonableness review when a particular sentence calls for
it and to more deferential review when it does not. This tactic will
be particularly useful in cases where district courts attempt to
push the bounds of their discretion by imposing sentences well
outside the advisory Guideline range, or where they try to shoe-
horn a new policy objection into the Kimbrough framework. By
recognizing that a particular sentence may be subject to much
closer scrutiny, district court judges will be encouraged to consider
all of the relevant factors when making a sentencing determina-
tion, rather than imposing sentences that increase disparity.
Furthermore, this approach will also allow the courts of appeals
to overcome some of the difficulties that have followed Gall and
Kimbrough. By closely reviewing those cases that the Supreme
Court has identified, the courts of appeals will fulfill their respon-
sibility to guide the district courts' discretion, while at the same
time clarifying the contours of reasonableness review. As one of
the last lines of defense against unwanted sentencing disparities
and the developers of the larger body of sentencing law, the courts
of appeals must embrace the tools that the Supreme Court has
given them to ensure that district courts continue to exercise
guided discretion. Nevertheless, once district courts and courts of
appeals begin to work together by following the directives of guid-
ed discretion, the federal judiciary will begin to develop a stronger,
163. Cf. Fumo, 2011 WL 3672774, at *30-*31 (indicating that insufficient explanation is
a common reason for reversing a sentence on procedural reasonableness grounds).
164. See discussion of the dicta in Gall and Kimbrough supra Parts II(C)(1)-(2).
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more coherent body of sentencing law that may begin to approxi-
mate a "common law of sentencing."
16 5
V. CONCLUSION
Six years after the landmark decision in United States v. Book-
er, federal sentencing remains a very controversial topic that has
been the subject of significant study and scholarship. Although
Booker and its progeny have given the federal courts guidance
with respect to imposing and reviewing sentences, that guidance
has led to almost as many questions as answers. Since Booker,
district court judges have begun to exercise an incredible amount
of discretion when making sentencing decisions, and the courts of
appeals need to continue learning how to keep that discretion in
check, while still giving proper deference to district court sentenc-
ing decisions.
This balance can be achieved through the use of guided discre-
tion, wherein sentencing judges must carefully weigh the Section
3553(a) factors and impose a sentence that balances discretion
with the need to reduce sentencing disparity. The sentencing
judge must also thoroughly explain how he or she weighed the
Section 3553(a) factors so as to provide a firm foundation on which
reasonableness review can take place. At the court of appeals lev-
el, judges should follow the guidance set forth in Rita, Gall, and
Kimbrough to aid in simplifying the appellate review process.
However, when faced with difficult questions related to the sub-
stantive reasonableness of an outside-Guidelines sentence, the
courts of appeals must not hesitate to engage in heightened review
as directed by both Gall and Kimbrough. By carefully doing so,
the courts of appeals will not only reduce problems associated with
sentencing disparity at the district court level, but they will also
begin to build and strengthen a more consistent and reliable defi-
nition of substantive reasonableness. Ultimately, as the federal
sentencing saga continues to unfold, it remains to be seen whether
more Supreme Court guidance is necessary, or whether the lower
federal courts will work together to develop a strong body of law
that will withstand the significant changes brought about by
Booker and its progeny.




STATISTICAL REVIEW OF SENTENCING
APPEALS, 1996-2009
Sentence Sentence
Year oSentence- & Convic- Affirmed on
only appeal tion appeal Appeal
2009 57.1 74.1 82.9
2008 54.1 72.9 80.8
2007 53.9 77.9 79
2006 60 83.6 67.8
2005 55.3 81.2 54.7
2004 48.6 69 79.5
2003 51.7 72.6 79.3
2002 48 71.4 79.1
2001 51 72.6 78.1
2000 40.9 61.9 78.8
1999 37.4 60.4 80.1
1998 35.1 57.1 79.7
1997 38.7 59.9 79.4
1996 38.5 62.3 79.7
1996-2009Ave6age 47.9 69.8 77.1Average
Post-
Booker Av- 56.3 77.1 77.6
erage
Pre-
Booker Av- 43.3 65.2 79.3
erage
2005 - 56.2 84.2 49.9
Post-Booker
2005-P00 B 52.1 70.5 74.6Pre-Booker
Source: United States Sentencing Commission
Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics for fiscal
years 1996-2009, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/Data-andStatistics/index.cfm
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